



FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION-2026

Recruitment to Posts in BS-17 under the Federal Government

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE-III
(PAKISTAN AFFAIRS)

— Fully Solved Edition —

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(Complete Solved Paper — Roman Urdu / English)

**Part I: 20 MCQs
Solved**

**Part II: All 6
Essays Solved**

**Detailed
Explanations**

Text Enlarged for Easy Reading • 24pt+ Font Throughout

Prepared as a study resource — facts researched and cross-checked where possible

EXAM DETAILS & INSTRUCTIONS

Time Allowed	Three Hours
Part-I (MCQs)	Maximum 30 Minutes — 20 Marks
Part-II	Maximum 80 Marks
Negative Marking	None — all MCQs must be attempted

Hidayat (Guidance): Har MCQ ke sath sahi jawab ko highlight kiya gaya hai aur ek mukhtasar wazahat (short explanation) di gayi hai. Part-II ke tamam 6 essay questions ka mukammal, structured, aur solved jawab is document mein shamil hai, taake koi bhi sawal chhoot na jaye.

PART-I — MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS (SOLVED)

*20 x 1 = 20 Marks | Waqt: 30 Minute | No
Negative Marking*

Q1. Article _____ empowers the Supreme Court to enforce Fundamental Rights directly.

- (A) 185(6)
- (B) 187(2)
- (C) Both A and B
- **(D) 184(3)**

Correct Answer: (D) 184(3)

Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to directly enforce Fundamental Rights (Articles 8-28) whenever a question of public importance is involved, without requiring the matter to first go through a High Court under Article 199.

Q2. India has constructed Baglihar Dam on _____ River.

- (A) Ravi
- (B) Indus
- (C) Jhelum
- **(D) None of these**

Correct Answer: (D) None of these

Baglihar Dam is a run-of-the-river hydroelectric project built by India on the Chenab River in Jammu & Kashmir. Since Chenab is not among options A-C, the correct choice is 'None of these'. (Common trick: many candidates mistakenly assume Jhelum.)

Q3. Pakistan Army provided training to which Middle Eastern country's armed forces in the 1970s?

- (A) Iran
- (B) Turkey
- **(C) UAE**
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (C) UAE

Following the UAE's formation in 1971, Pakistani Army, Navy and Air Force personnel served as advisors and instructors who played a foundational role in building the UAE's armed forces during the 1970s, a cooperation that continues to be remembered warmly in bilateral relations.

Q4. Which constitutional amendment generated debate about judicial reforms?

- (A) 26th Amendment
- (B) 27th Amendment
- **(C) Both (A) & (B)**
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (C) Both (A) & (B)

The 26th Amendment (Oct 2024) changed the Chief Justice appointment mechanism and created a Constitutional Bench, while the 27th Amendment (Nov 2025) established a full Federal Constitutional Court and reshaped the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Both triggered intense debate on judicial independence.

Q5. Which province introduced a "Green Energy Transition Policy" in 2024?

- (A) Balochistan
- **(B) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**
- (C) Punjab
- (D) Sindh

Correct Answer: (B) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, endowed with strong hydel and solar potential, has been the most active province in rolling out green/renewable energy transition initiatives (solarisation of public buildings, hydropower expansion) around 2024, in line with its provincial climate and energy policy push.

Q6. The edited volume "The Future of Pakistan" is authored by:

- (A) Anatol Lieven
- **(B) Stephen P. Cohen**
- (C) Pervez Hoodbhoy
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (B) Stephen P. Cohen

'The Future of Pakistan' (Brookings Institution Press, 2011) is an edited volume compiled by Stephen P. Cohen, bringing together essays from multiple South Asia scholars on Pakistan's trajectory.

Q7. The establishment and structure of the Supreme Court is provided under Article_____:

- (A) 63–64
- (B) 99
- **(C) 176–191**
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (C) 176–191

Part VII, Chapter 1 (Articles 176 to 191) of the Constitution deals with the establishment, composition, jurisdiction and procedure of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Q8. Pakistan joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in:

- (A) 1956
- (B) 1973
- (C) 1981
- **(D) None of these**

Correct Answer: (D) None of these

Pakistan became a member of the IMF on 11 July 1950, shortly after independence. As 1950 is not among the given options, the correct answer is 'None of these'.

Q9. Badshahi Mosque was built by:

- (A) Akbar
- (B) Shah Jahan
- (C) Jahangir
- **(D) None of these**

Correct Answer: (D) None of these

The Badshahi Mosque in Lahore was commissioned in 1671 by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir, not by Akbar, Shah Jahan or Jahangir. Hence the correct choice is 'None of these'.

Q10. SAARC was founded in:

■ **(A) 1985**

● (B) 1975

● (C) 1980

● (D) 1987

Correct Answer: (A) 1985

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formally established on 8 December 1985 in Dhaka, with Pakistan as a founding member.

Q11. Pakistan's largest solar park is in:

- (A) Gwadar
- **(B) Bahawalpur**
- (C) Dera Ismail Khan
- (D) Sukkur

Correct Answer: (B) Bahawalpur

The Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park, located in the Cholistan desert near Bahawalpur (Punjab), is Pakistan's largest solar power facility, with a planned capacity of up to 1,000 MW.

Q12. _____ was the Ottoman Caliph when the Khilafat movement began.

■ **(A) Mehmed VI**

● (B) Murad V

● (C) Abdul Hameed II

● (D) Abdul Mejid II

Correct Answer: (A) Mehmed VI

The Khilafat Movement began around 1919-1920 in the aftermath of WWI, when Sultan Mehmed VI (r. 1918-1922) was the reigning Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, and the movement sought to protect his temporal authority from Allied dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

Q13. Who is the author of the book "Making Sense of Pakistan"?

- (A) Ayesha Jalal
- **(B) Farzana Shaikh**
- (C) Anatol Lieven
- (D) K.K Aziz

Correct Answer: (B) Farzana Shaikh

'Making Sense of Pakistan' (2009) was written by Farzana Shaikh, a scholar at Chatham House, exploring the ideological confusion at the heart of the Pakistani state.

Q14. The only Pakistani PM who visited the US and addressed a joint session of Congress is:

- **(A) Benazir Bhutto**
- (B) Liaquat Ali Khan
- (C) Shaukat Aziz
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (A) Benazir Bhutto

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto addressed a Joint Meeting of the United States Congress on 7 June 1989 during her state visit — she remains the only Pakistani Prime Minister to have received this honour.

Q15. Which Middle Eastern country was the first to recognize Pakistan in 1947?

- (A) Saudi Arabia
- (B) Egypt
- **(C) Iran**
- (D) Iraq

Correct Answer: (C) Iran

Iran was the first country in the world to formally recognise Pakistan, doing so on 14-15 August 1947, immediately upon Pakistan's creation, reflecting the deep historical and cultural ties between the two neighbours.

Q16. _____ was the first country to purchase the JF-17 Thunder fighter Jet.

- **(A) Myanmar**
- (B) Azerbaijan
- (C) Libya
- (D) Nigeria

Correct Answer: (A) Myanmar

Myanmar placed the first export order for the JF-17 Thunder in 2015, becoming the type's first foreign customer, ahead of Nigeria (2021) and Azerbaijan (2024).

Q17. Which sector is projected to be the primary driver of Pakistan's GDP growth under the latest 5 year plan (2024-29)?

- (A) Agriculture only
- (B) Heavy manufacturing
- **(C) Services sector**
- (D) None of these

Correct Answer: (C) Services sector

Under 'Uraan Pakistan' (National Economic Transformation Plan 2024-29), the services sector — already contributing over half of national GDP — is projected to remain the leading driver of growth, alongside export-led reforms in IT, finance and allied services.

Q18. Which of the following is not included in the '5 Es Framework to Turnaround Pakistan?'

- (A) Equity & empowerment
- (B) Environment
- (C) E-Pakistan
- **(D) Efficiency**

Correct Answer: (D) Efficiency

The official 5 Es Framework underpinning 'Uraan Pakistan' comprises: Exports, E-Pakistan, Equity & Empowerment, Environment (food & water security), and Energy & Infrastructure. 'Efficiency' is not one of the five pillars, making it the correct answer.

Q19. _____ founded the Khaksar Tehreek.

- (A) Maulana Hasrat Mohani
- **(B) Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi**
- (C) Allama Shibli Nomani
- (D) Maulana Abu al Kalam Azad

Correct Answer: (B) Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi

The Khaksar Tehreek, a disciplined socio-political movement known for its khaki uniforms and 'belcha' (spade), was founded by Allama Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi in Lahore in 1930.

Q20. Islamabad officially became the capital of Pakistan in:

- (A) 1969
- (B) 1966
- (C) 1962
- **(D) None of these**

Correct Answer: (D) None of these

Islamabad officially became Pakistan's capital on 14 August 1967 — exactly twenty years after independence — after Rawalpindi had served as the temporary capital from 1959. As 1967 is not listed, the correct choice is 'None of these'.

PART-II — DETAILED / SOLVED ANSWERS

Exam instruction: Attempt ONLY FOUR questions from Part-II (all carry equal marks, 20 each). For completeness and revision purposes, model solved answers to ALL SIX questions are provided below.

Note: Imtihan mein sirf CHAAR (4) sawalat attempt karne hain. Yahan mukammal taiyari (complete preparation) ke liye TAMAM CHHE (6) sawalat ka jawab diya gaya hai.

Q.No. 2

[20 Marks]

Conduct a comprehensive appraisal of the similarities and differences between Iqbal's philosophical ideas and Jinnah's political interpretation of the Pakistan ideology.

Introduction

Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) are jointly regarded as the intellectual and political architects of Pakistan. While Iqbal supplied the philosophical vision of a distinct Muslim polity rooted in spiritual and cultural self-realisation, Jinnah translated that vision into a concrete constitutional and political demand. Understanding both the convergence and divergence of their thought is essential to appreciate the full depth of the 'Pakistan Ideology'.

1. Iqbal's Philosophical Contribution

- Khudi (Selfhood): Iqbal's central philosophical concept, developed in 'Asrar-e-Khudi' (1915), held that individual and collective self-realisation is the path to human and communal excellence — a Muslim community that recognises its own khudi can shape its own destiny rather than be absorbed into another culture.
- Two-Nation concept in embryo: In his historic Allahabad Address of 1930, Iqbal argued that Islam is not merely a matter of private belief but a complete social order with its own principles of civic life; he proposed the consolidation of Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan into a single Muslim state within (or outside) British India.
- Cultural-civilizational framing: Iqbal's vision was primarily philosophical, poetic and civilisational — he was concerned with

reviving the dynamic, creative spirit of the Muslim ummah rather than drafting an immediate political programme.

- Pan-Islamic yet regionally rooted: Iqbal balanced a broader pan-Islamic consciousness with a practical recognition that Muslims of the sub-continent required a specific territorial and political arrangement to protect their distinct identity.

2. Jinnah's Political Interpretation

- Constitutionalist approach: Jinnah, trained as a barrister, converted Iqbal's civilisational insight into a constitutional demand — the Lahore Resolution of 1940 called for 'independent states' for Muslims, formalising the political expression of the two-nation theory.
- Two-Nation Theory as political doctrine: Jinnah argued that Muslims and Hindus

were two distinct nations by every definition — religion, culture, social customs, law and history — and therefore could not be safely accommodated within a single unitary, Hindu-majority democracy.

- Pragmatic negotiator: Unlike Iqbal's poetic idealism, Jinnah operated through constitutional negotiation (Round Table Conferences, the Cripps Mission, the Cabinet Mission Plan) and mass mobilisation through the All-India Muslim League to secure a separate homeland.
- Vision of a modern, inclusive state: Jinnah's 11 August 1947 address to the Constituent Assembly emphasised equal citizenship regardless of religion, caste or creed, envisioning Pakistan as a modern nation-state rather than a purely theocratic one — a subtly different emphasis from Iqbal's more explicitly Islamic civilisational framing.

3. Points of Convergence

- Both rejected the assumption that Hindus and Muslims formed a single composite Indian nation.
- Both saw a separate Muslim polity as necessary for the preservation of Muslim political, cultural and religious identity.
- Both viewed Islam as providing the unifying ideological bond for a future Muslim state, even while differing on how explicitly that bond should be constitutionally expressed.
- Iqbal's letters to Jinnah (1936-37) directly influenced Jinnah's political strategy, showing an evolving intellectual partnership.

4. Points of Divergence

- Nature of the vision: Iqbal's was primarily philosophical/spiritual (khudi, revival of Islamic thought), while Jinnah's was constitutional/political (a sovereign, functioning state with clear boundaries and institutions).
- Scope of the state: Iqbal's 1930 proposal was somewhat ambiguous about full sovereignty versus autonomy within a federation; Jinnah's demand hardened, by 1940, into a call for fully independent, sovereign states.
- Idiom: Iqbal communicated largely through poetry and philosophical prose aimed at awakening Muslim consciousness; Jinnah communicated through legal argument, political organisation and diplomatic negotiation aimed at securing a settlement.
- Religious versus civic emphasis: Iqbal's ideal state leaned toward an Islamic order rooted in the Sharia's ethical spirit; Jinnah's

public pronouncements, especially post-independence, stressed a civic, pluralistic and constitutional state for 'Pakistanis' as citizens.

Conclusion

In essence, Iqbal provided the philosophical soul and Jinnah the political body of the Pakistan Movement. Their partnership illustrates how an abstract civilisational idea can be transformed, through pragmatic leadership, into a concrete nation-state. The occasional differences in emphasis — spiritual versus constitutional, ideal versus pragmatic — do not represent a contradiction but rather a natural division of labour between a visionary philosopher-poet and a master political strategist, both converging on the shared goal of Muslim self-determination in South Asia.

Q.No. 3

[20 Marks]

“The instability in Afghanistan continues to influence Pakistan's internal security, regional diplomacy, and counter terrorism strategy”. Critically examine the above statement and suggest policy measures to address the issue/challenge.

Introduction

Pakistan shares a porous, 2,600+ km border with Afghanistan (the Durand Line) and has historically been the country most directly affected by Afghan instability — from the Soviet invasion and refugee influx of the 1980s, to the Taliban's return to power in August 2021 and the subsequent resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The statement is largely valid: Afghan instability continues to generate direct security, diplomatic and strategic costs for Pakistan.

1. Impact on Internal Security

- TTP resurgence: Since the Afghan Taliban's takeover, the TTP has intensified cross-border attacks on Pakistani security forces, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, exploiting sanctuaries on Afghan soil.
- Rise in terrorism-related casualties: Pakistan has witnessed a marked increase in militant attacks in recent years, with security forces and civilians bearing the brunt, straining law-enforcement and military resources.
- Weapons proliferation: Advanced weaponry left behind after the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan has reportedly found its way into militant hands, amplifying the lethality of attacks inside Pakistan.
- Refugee and demographic pressure: Successive waves of Afghan refugees

have created socio-economic strain, law-and-order challenges, and complications in the recent repatriation drives.

2. Impact on Regional Diplomacy

- Strained Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: Islamabad's repeated demands that the Afghan Taliban act against TTP sanctuaries have produced friction, border closures and periodic exchanges of fire, complicating what was once expected to be a friendlier post-2021 relationship.
- Effect on CPEC and regional connectivity: Persistent insecurity discourages the extension of trade and connectivity corridors (including potential linkages to Central Asia) through Afghan territory, and raises security costs for CPEC projects in KP and Balochistan.

- Great-power and regional competition: Instability invites competing interests from India, China, Russia, Iran and Gulf states, complicating Pakistan's efforts to shape a stable, friendly western neighbourhood.
- Humanitarian diplomacy: Pakistan has had to balance humanitarian obligations toward Afghan refugees with growing domestic political pressure for their repatriation.

3. Impact on Counter-Terrorism Strategy

- Shift from law-and-order to hybrid warfare posture: The military has had to combine conventional counter-insurgency operations (e.g., in KP and Balochistan) with border-management measures such as fencing and biometric checkpoints.

- Strain on National Action Plan (NAP) implementation: Cross-border militancy undermines the gains of earlier operations (Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad) and tests the coherence of the civil-military counter-terrorism framework.
- Diplomatic-military balancing act: Pakistan must calibrate limited cross-border strikes against TTP hideouts without triggering a full diplomatic rupture with Kabul.

4. Policy Measures / Way Forward

- Engage the Afghan Taliban through sustained, structured diplomacy — backed by regional players (China, Gulf states) — to secure verifiable action against TTP sanctuaries rather than relying solely on unilateral military options.
- Strengthen border management: complete and technologically upgrade the Pak-Afghan border fence, expand

biometric registration, and enhance intelligence-sharing among security agencies.

- Revitalise the National Action Plan with renewed political consensus, adequate resourcing, and a clear division of responsibilities between civilian and military institutions.
- Pursue regional and multilateral diplomacy — through platforms such as the SCO, OIC and trilateral/quadrilateral dialogues with China, Iran and Central Asian states — to build coordinated pressure against cross-border terrorism.
- Manage the Afghan refugee issue through an orderly, phased and humane repatriation framework, coupled with support for voluntary return and reintegration.
- Invest in socio-economic development of border regions (KP's merged districts,

Balochistan) to reduce the recruitment appeal of militant networks and address local grievances.

- Encourage economic interdependence — trade, transit and connectivity arrangements — as an incentive structure that gives both Kabul and Islamabad a stake in stability.

Conclusion

Afghan instability remains one of the most consequential external variables shaping Pakistan's security calculus. A durable response requires moving beyond a purely military lens toward an integrated strategy combining diplomacy, border governance, regional cooperation and socio-economic development — recognising that lasting peace on Pakistan's western frontier is inseparable from a stable, cooperative Afghanistan.

Q.No. 4

[20 Marks]

To what extent does the 27th Constitutional Amendment strengthens or weakens constitutionalism and rule of law in Pakistan? Justify your stance with valid arguments.

Introduction

The 27th Constitutional Amendment, passed by Parliament in November 2025 amid a highly contentious and expedited legislative process, represents one of the most far-reaching restructurings of Pakistan's constitutional order since 1973. It creates a new Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), establishes the post of Chief of Defence Forces, and extends significant immunities to top office-holders. Its impact on constitutionalism and the rule of law is deeply contested between supporters and critics.

1. Key Provisions of the Amendment

- Establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) as a specialised forum for constitutional matters, stripping the Supreme Court of its original constitutional jurisdiction.
- Creation of the office of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), placing unified command of the Army, Navy and Air Force under a single officer, with five-star ranks made constitutionally protected and lifelong.
- Extension of lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution to the President and the Chief of Defence Forces / Field Marshal, even after leaving office.
- Changes to the mechanism of appointing FCC judges, with significant executive input via the President acting on the Prime Minister's advice.

2. Arguments That It Strengthens Constitutionalism (Supporters' View)

- Proponents argue a dedicated Constitutional Court can reduce the Supreme Court's case backlog and allow for more specialised, consistent constitutional adjudication.
- A unified military command structure is presented as necessary for coherent national security decision-making amid persistent internal and external threats.
- Supporters frame the amendment as a democratically legitimate exercise of Parliament's constitutional amending power, passed with the required two-thirds majority in both houses.
- It is argued that institutionalising command structures provides clarity and continuity in an era of complex, multi-domain security challenges.

3. Arguments That It Weakens Rule of Law and Constitutionalism (Critics' View)

- Concentration of power: By curbing the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and vesting significant appointment powers in the executive over the new FCC, critics argue the amendment undermines the separation of powers and checks on executive authority.
- Erosion of judicial independence: The absence of transparent, objective criteria for appointing the first FCC judges raises concerns that the new court could become subject to executive influence rather than functioning as a genuinely independent check.

- Broad immunity clauses: Lifelong immunity for the President and Chief of Defence Forces is seen by legal scholars as inconsistent with the foundational principle that no one is above the law — a cornerstone of rule of law.
- Civil-military balance: Formalising an overarching military command role at the constitutional level, critics argue, further tilts Pakistan's historically fragile civil-military equilibrium toward the security establishment.
- Process concerns: The unusually rapid passage of the amendment — introduced, debated and signed into law within roughly a week — with limited public consultation, is cited as undermining the deliberative, consensus-based spirit that constitutionalism requires.
- Risk of parallel judicial systems: Overlapping jurisdiction between the FCC

and the Supreme Court could create ambiguity, forum-shopping, and inconsistent constitutional interpretation over time.

4. A Balanced Assessment

- On procedural/formal legality, the amendment meets the constitutional threshold (two-thirds majority) and can be described as legally valid.
- On substantive constitutionalism — limited government, separation of powers, judicial independence and equality before the law — the weight of expert opinion (domestic legal community, international observers, human-rights bodies) leans toward the view that the amendment weakens these principles more than it strengthens them.
- The long-term impact will depend heavily on how the FCC's composition evolves and whether future amendments or judicial

review narrow or widen the scope of executive discretion introduced by the 27th Amendment.

Conclusion

On balance, while the 27th Amendment may deliver certain administrative efficiencies (a dedicated constitutional forum, unified defence command), its cumulative effect — expanded executive control over judicial appointments, lifelong immunities, and a truncated Supreme Court role — tilts more toward weakening constitutionalism and the rule of law than strengthening it. A durable resolution would require transparent judicial appointment criteria, meaningful parliamentary and public consultation on future amendments, and institutional safeguards to prevent the erosion of checks and balances.

Q.No. 5

[20 Marks]

Critically assess how youth perspectives, digital activism, and civil society movements are influencing civil military relations.

Introduction

Pakistan's youth bulge — with roughly two-thirds of the population under the age of 30 — combined with near-universal smartphone and social-media penetration, has produced a new and increasingly assertive dynamic in the traditionally opaque domain of civil-military relations. Digital platforms have given youth and civil society an unprecedented ability to question, scrutinise and mobilise around issues once considered off-limits for public debate.

1. Changing Youth Perspectives

- A generation raised amid economic uncertainty, unemployment and repeated political instability increasingly questions the military's traditionally dominant role in politics and the economy.
- Youth engagement is less deferential to institutional authority and more oriented toward accountability, transparency and civilian supremacy, reflecting broader global trends in youth political culture.
- Educational expansion and exposure to global political discourse have made younger Pakistanis more comparative in outlook, benchmarking domestic civil-military arrangements against democratic norms elsewhere.

2. Digital Activism as a New Battlefield

- Social media (X/Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Facebook) has become a primary arena where narratives about the military's political role are contested, amplified or challenged in real time.
- Hashtag campaigns, viral commentary and diaspora-driven online mobilisation have repeatedly forced issues — such as allegations of political engineering, enforced disappearances, or media censorship — into mainstream public conversation.
- The state's response has included periodic internet slowdowns, platform restrictions and cyber-crime legislation (e.g., PECA amendments), reflecting the perceived threat digital activism poses to controlled narratives.

- Digital activism has also enabled counter-narratives and pro-institution messaging, showing that the space is contested rather than one-directional.

3. Civil Society Movements

- Rights-based movements (e.g., around missing persons, minority rights, and provincial grievances in Balochistan and the former FATA/merged districts) have used peaceful protest and digital documentation to pressure both civilian governments and security institutions.
- Lawyers' associations, journalist bodies and human-rights organisations continue to play a watchdog role, often amplified through digital media, on issues of due process and press freedom.
- Youth-led political mobilisation around specific parties or causes has demonstrated the capacity of digitally

organised movements to influence electoral outcomes and public discourse on civil-military boundaries.

4. Effects on Civil-Military Relations

- Increased scrutiny: The military's public image and actions are subject to far greater real-time scrutiny than in earlier decades, constraining (though not eliminating) the space for unchallenged narrative control.
- Narrative contestation: Both pro-military and anti-establishment narratives now compete openly online, fragmenting the previously more centralised control of the national conversation.

- Policy responses: The state has responded with a mix of legal/regulatory measures (cyber laws, restrictions on 'anti-state' content) and strategic communication efforts (military media wings expanding their own digital presence).
- Generational gap in trust: Surveys and public commentary suggest younger citizens are more willing to publicly question institutional roles than older generations, gradually shifting the terms of the civil-military debate.
- Risk of polarisation: Digital activism has also contributed to sharper societal polarisation, with echo chambers hardening opposing positions rather than fostering measured dialogue.

Conclusion

Youth perspectives and digital activism have undeniably expanded the space for public

discourse on civil-military relations, making the military's political role a subject of open — if often polarised — debate rather than a taboo topic. However, this shift has not yet translated into structural change in the balance of civil-military power; rather, it has created a more contested information environment in which both civilian and military actors must increasingly compete for legitimacy in the digital public square. Sustained institutional reform, rather than online contestation alone, will ultimately determine whether this generational shift translates into durable civilian supremacy.

Q.No. 6

[20 Marks]

Undertake a concise assessment of the key economic challenges currently confronting Pakistan. Illustrate how IMF's conditions can shape the country's path towards economic stabilization and long-term financial sustainability?

Introduction

Pakistan's economy remains characterised by a familiar boom-and-bust cycle: recurring balance-of-payments crises, a narrow tax base, high public debt, and structural weaknesses in exports and energy. The current IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme, alongside the 'Uraan Pakistan' (2024-29) transformation plan, frames the country's near-term stabilisation and reform agenda.

1. Key Economic Challenges

- Fiscal deficit and debt burden: Persistent fiscal deficits, driven by a narrow tax-to-GDP ratio (around 10-11%), heavy debt-servicing costs, and large untaxed sectors (agriculture, retail, real estate), continue to constrain fiscal space.
- Balance-of-payments vulnerability: Low export competitiveness relative to imports, dependence on remittances, and periodic foreign-exchange reserve crises leave Pakistan structurally exposed to external shocks.
- Energy sector inefficiencies: Circular debt in the power sector, high generation costs, and transmission/distribution losses continue to burden public finances and raise electricity tariffs for consumers and industry alike.
- Low exports and productivity: Exports remain concentrated in low value-added

textiles; weak productivity growth and an unfavourable business environment limit diversification into higher-value manufacturing and services.

- Inflation and cost-of-living pressures: Although inflation has moderated from its 2023 peak, food and energy price volatility continues to strain household budgets, particularly for lower-income groups.
- Governance and institutional weaknesses: State-owned enterprise losses, weak tax administration, and inconsistent policy continuity across governments undermine investor confidence.
- Climate vulnerability: Recurrent floods and climate shocks (as in 2022) impose significant reconstruction costs and threaten agricultural output and food security.

2. Role of IMF Conditionalities in Shaping Stabilisation

- Fiscal consolidation: IMF programmes typically require primary budget surpluses, expanded tax collection (including broadening the tax net to agriculture and retail), and reduced subsidies — measures aimed at restoring fiscal sustainability but which can be politically and socially difficult.
- Exchange rate flexibility: Conditions requiring a market-determined exchange rate help correct external imbalances and rebuild foreign reserves, though at the cost of near-term imported inflation.
- Energy sector reforms: IMF-mandated tariff rationalisation and circular-debt reduction plans aim to make the power sector financially viable, even as they raise short-term costs for consumers.

- Monetary policy discipline: Central bank independence and inflation-targeting conditions help anchor inflation expectations and improve macroeconomic credibility with international creditors and investors.
- Structural reforms: Privatisation or restructuring of loss-making state-owned enterprises, improved governance in tax administration, and business-environment reforms are aimed at raising long-term productive capacity.
- Social safety nets: IMF programmes increasingly build in protections (e.g., expansion of the Benazir Income Support Programme) intended to cushion vulnerable groups from the impact of austerity measures.

3. Balancing Stabilisation with Long-Term Sustainability

- Short-term stabilisation (avoiding default, rebuilding reserves, controlling inflation) must be complemented by structural reforms (tax base broadening, export diversification, energy efficiency) to avoid a recurring cycle of IMF programmes.
- Political ownership and consistent implementation across changes in government are essential, since previous programmes have often been derailed by policy reversals.
- Complementary domestic initiatives — such as the 5Es framework under Uraan Pakistan (Exports, E-Pakistan, Equity & Empowerment, Environment, Energy) — aim to align with, and extend beyond, IMF-mandated stabilisation toward sustained, export-led growth.

Conclusion

Pakistan's economic challenges are structural rather than merely cyclical, rooted in narrow revenue bases, energy inefficiencies and weak export competitiveness. IMF conditionalities provide an external discipline mechanism that can stabilise the immediate fiscal and external position, but genuine long-term financial sustainability will depend on Pakistan's own political commitment to sustained structural reform — broadening taxation, reforming the energy sector, and diversifying exports — rather than reform driven solely by programme conditionality.

Q.No. 7

[20 Marks]

“The unresolved Kashmir issue exposes the inherent weakness in United Nations Security Council's Architecture.” Critically examine the role of UNSC in resolving the Kashmir issue.

Introduction

The Jammu & Kashmir dispute, on the UN Security Council's agenda since January 1948 (UNSC Resolution 39), remains one of the longest-unresolved items in the Council's history. Despite multiple resolutions calling for a UN-supervised plebiscite, the dispute persists — illustrating, as the statement suggests, structural weaknesses in the Council's architecture and enforcement capacity.

1. UNSC's Historical Engagement with Kashmir

- Resolution 47 (1948) called for a ceasefire, troop withdrawal, and a UN-supervised plebiscite to determine the state's accession — a framework India and Pakistan initially accepted but never implemented.
- The establishment of UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) in 1949 to monitor the ceasefire line remains one of the UN's longest-running peacekeeping missions, yet its mandate has been progressively marginalised, especially by India, which disputes its continued relevance since the 1972 Simla Agreement.

- Subsequent Council engagement has been sporadic, with informal consultations (such as in August 2019 following India's revocation of Article 370) rather than binding new resolutions.

2. Structural Weaknesses of the UNSC Exposed by the Dispute

- Veto power and P5 politics: The interests and alliances of the five permanent members (particularly shifting US and, at times, Chinese and Russian positions) have prevented consensus on enforcement measures, reducing Kashmir resolutions to non-binding recommendations.
- Absence of an enforcement mechanism: Unlike Chapter VII resolutions, the original Kashmir resolutions were adopted without provisions for compulsory implementation, leaving them dependent on the goodwill of the parties involved.

- Selectivity and double standards: Critics argue the Council's willingness to act decisively in some disputes while remaining largely passive on Kashmir reflects an uneven application of international law based on great-power interests rather than principle.
- Erosion of relevance over time: As unresolved disputes persist for decades, affected populations and disputing states increasingly view the Council's resolutions as symbolic rather than operative, undermining the UN's broader credibility as a conflict-resolution body.
- Bilateralism versus multilateralism: The 1972 Simla Agreement's emphasis on bilateral resolution has been used by India to argue against continued UN involvement, illustrating how bilateral frameworks can be leveraged to sideline multilateral mechanisms.

3. Pakistan's Position and Continued Advocacy

- Pakistan continues to raise Kashmir at the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council, seeking to keep the issue internationally salient, particularly regarding human-rights concerns in Indian-administered Kashmir.
- Pakistan maintains that UNSC resolutions remain legally valid and binding until implemented, and that the right of self-determination for Kashmiris under those resolutions has not lapsed.

4. Broader Implications

- The Kashmir case is frequently cited alongside disputes like Palestine as evidence for the need to reform the UNSC — expanding permanent membership, curbing veto use in cases of alleged human-rights violations, and strengthening implementation mechanisms for long-standing resolutions.
- It also highlights the limits of multilateral diplomacy when a dispute is deeply entangled with nuclear deterrence dynamics between two nuclear-armed neighbours, raising the stakes for any Council action.

Conclusion

The seven-decades-long non-implementation of UNSC resolutions on Kashmir is a stark illustration of the Council's structural limitations — great-power veto politics, non-binding recommendations, and selective

enforcement. While the UNSC's original resolutions retain legal and moral significance, meaningful resolution of the Kashmir dispute will likely require sustained bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement, confidence-building measures, and renewed international attention, rather than reliance on the Council's enforcement architecture alone.

Q.No. 8

[20 Marks]

Critically assess the performance of health and education sectors after being handed over to the Provinces under the 18th amendment and suggest way forward.

Introduction

The 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010) abolished the Concurrent Legislative List, devolving subjects such as health and education entirely to the provinces. Fifteen years on, the devolution has produced a mixed record: greater provincial ownership and some notable reforms, but also persistent disparities, coordination gaps and underinvestment.

1. Intent and Structure of Devolution

- The 18th Amendment aimed to strengthen provincial autonomy and bring

social-sector governance closer to local needs and contexts, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity.

- Health and education, along with related subjects like population welfare and curriculum (later partly re-centralised for a single national curriculum), became primarily provincial responsibilities, with the federal government retaining a coordinating and standard-setting role in limited areas.

2. Performance in the Health Sector

- Positive developments: Some provinces (notably Punjab and, more recently, KP) have expanded health-insurance schemes (e.g., the Sehat Sahulat/Sehat Card programmes) and undertaken primary healthcare reforms.
- Persistent challenges: Wide inter-provincial disparities remain — Balochistan and rural

Sindh continue to lag significantly behind Punjab and urban centres in key indicators such as maternal mortality, child stunting and immunisation coverage.

- Weak regulatory coordination: Public health emergencies (e.g., disease outbreaks, the COVID-19 pandemic) exposed coordination gaps between federal and provincial health authorities, as devolved provinces sometimes pursued divergent policies.
- Underinvestment: Public health spending as a share of GDP remains among the lowest in the region, despite devolution, constraining infrastructure, staffing and essential-medicine availability.
- Human resource shortages: Rural and remote areas continue to face acute shortages of doctors, nurses and paramedical staff, undermining service delivery despite provincial control.

3. Performance in the Education Sector

- Positive developments: Several provinces have invested in school infrastructure, teacher-recruitment reforms, and public-private partnerships (e.g., the Punjab Education Foundation, KP's monitoring and Independent Monitoring Unit reforms) that have improved enrolment and reduced ghost-teacher/ghost-school issues in some districts.
- Persistent challenges: Pakistan continues to have one of the world's largest out-of-school-children populations (over 20 million), with acute gender and rural-urban gaps, particularly in Balochistan and interior Sindh.
- Curriculum fragmentation: Devolved curricula led to inconsistency across provinces, prompting the federal government's Single National Curriculum

initiative — itself contested for insufficiently accounting for provincial and linguistic diversity.

- Quality deficits: Even where enrolment has improved, learning outcomes remain weak, as reflected in low literacy and numeracy scores in national and provincial assessments (e.g., ASER reports).
- Financing gaps: Education spending, though nominally increased in absolute terms by some provinces, still falls short of the long-standing national commitment to allocate 4% of GDP to education.

4. Way Forward

- Strengthen federal-provincial coordination mechanisms (e.g., the Council of Common Interests, inter-provincial health and education ministerial forums) to harmonise standards while preserving provincial autonomy.

- Increase and protect health and education budgets at the provincial level, with transparent, performance-linked allocation of resources.
- Invest in human-resource development — recruitment, training and equitable rural deployment of teachers and healthcare workers, supported by incentive structures for underserved areas.
- Expand and standardise digital monitoring systems (e.g., real-time school and health-facility attendance tracking) to improve accountability and reduce leakages.
- Address regional disparities directly through targeted federal transfers or conditional grants for lagging regions such as Balochistan and rural Sindh, without undermining the spirit of devolution.

- Pursue evidence-based curriculum and public-health-policy harmonisation that balances national cohesion with provincial and linguistic diversity.
- Strengthen public-private partnerships and community-based models that have shown success in expanding access and quality where directly managed by provinces.

Conclusion

Devolution under the 18th Amendment has given provinces the constitutional authority to tailor health and education policy to local needs, and some provinces have used this space productively. However, uneven capacity, inconsistent financing, and weak inter-governmental coordination have prevented devolution from translating into uniformly improved outcomes nationwide. A way forward lies not in reversing devolution, but in strengthening provincial capacity,

ensuring adequate and equitable financing, and building robust coordination mechanisms that preserve provincial ownership while closing regional gaps.