

# Pakistan Affairs 2022

## Solved Past Paper

General Knowledge-III — Complete Model Answers with Key-Point Highlights

**Examination:** Competitive Examination-2022 for Recruitment to Posts in BS-17

**Paper:** General Knowledge-III (Pakistan Affairs)

**Part-II Marks:** 80 (Part-I MCQs: 20)

**Instruction Followed:** All seven Part-II questions solved in full

PREPARED MODEL ANSWERS FOR EXAM PRACTICE

## Paper Format & Instructions

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| <b>Time Allowed:</b> Three Hours         | <b>Part-I (MCQs):</b> Maximum Marks = 20 |
| <b>Part-I (MCQs):</b> Maximum 30 Minutes | <b>Part-II:</b> Maximum Marks = 80       |

**Note on this edition:** The source paper supplied for solving contained only the **Part-II subjective questions** (Q.2–Q.8); no Part-I MCQ page was present in the file, so no MCQs have been invented here. All seven Part-II questions have been answered in full below, even though the original exam instructions require attempting only four — this was done so the solved edition is complete and useful for revision of the entire paper.

**Original exam instructions (unchanged):** Part-II is to be attempted on a separate Answer Book. Attempt ONLY FOUR questions from Part-II — all carry equal marks (20 each). All parts of a question must be attempted together. No page should be left blank between answers. Extra attempts will not be considered.

## Part-II — Solved Questions

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*Discuss the role of regional and nationalist political parties in Pakistani politics. How far these parties are necessary for the political system?*

### Introduction

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual federation comprising Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Alongside the mainstream national parties (PML-N, PPP, PTI), a large number of regional and nationalist parties have shaped the political landscape by voicing provincial, ethnic and sub-national demands.

### Major Regional and Nationalist Parties

- **Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM):** Represents the Mohajir/urban Sindh population, particularly in Karachi and Hyderabad.
- **Awami National Party (ANP):** Espouses Pakhtun nationalism, historically strong in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- **Balochistan National Party (BNP-Mengal), National Party, Balochistan Awami Party (BAP):** Champion Baloch provincial rights, resource-control and autonomy.
- **Sindh United Party / Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA):** Voice Sindhi nationalist and rural-Sindh interests.
- **Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F):** Though religio-political, draws its core strength from Pakhtun and Baloch belt constituencies.

### Role in the Political System

- **Voice for provincial grievances:** They articulate demands relating to resource distribution, provincial autonomy, and local employment that national parties often overlook.
- **Coalition politics:** Since no single party has consistently won an outright majority, regional parties have played kingmaker roles in forming federal governments (e.g., MQM and ANP in various coalitions).
- **Push for constitutional reform:** Sustained nationalist pressure was a major driving force behind the 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010), which enhanced provincial autonomy and abolished the Concurrent Legislative List.
- **Political representation of minorities and periphery:** They give a parliamentary voice to communities that would otherwise remain unrepresented in a Punjab-dominated polity.

**Key Point:** Regional parties act as a safety valve — by channelling ethnic and provincial grievances into parliamentary politics, they reduce the likelihood of these grievances turning into separatist or violent movements.

### **Are They Necessary for the Political System?**

In a federation as diverse as Pakistan, regional and nationalist parties are largely necessary and beneficial because:

- They keep the federation responsive to local aspirations, preventing over-centralization.
- They strengthen genuine federalism and democratic pluralism rather than a monolithic centre.
- Historical experience (loss of East Pakistan in 1971) shows that ignoring regional political voices carries existential risk for the federation.

However, critics argue that an excessive proliferation of ethnic parties can also fragment the vote, encourage parochialism over national cohesion, and complicate stable coalition-building at the centre.

**Conclusion:** On balance, regional and nationalist parties are a necessary feature of Pakistan's federal democracy. They must, however, operate within a framework that balances provincial rights with national unity, ensuring that legitimate local demands strengthen rather than weaken the federation.

*Discuss the Federal Structure of 1973 Constitution of Pakistan after 18th Amendment. Why criticism on 18th Amendment started recently?*

### Introduction

The 1973 Constitution established Pakistan as a federal parliamentary republic with power shared between the Centre and four provinces. The 18th Amendment (2010) was the most far-reaching constitutional reform, fundamentally reshaping this federal balance in favour of the provinces.

### Federal Structure Before the 18th Amendment

- A Concurrent Legislative List allowed both federal and provincial governments to legislate on 47 subjects, in practice giving the Centre dominance.
- The President held sweeping discretionary powers, including Article 58(2)(b), enabling dissolution of assemblies.
- Provinces had limited fiscal autonomy and depended heavily on federal transfers.

### Key Changes Introduced by the 18th Amendment

- **Abolition of the Concurrent List:** Subjects such as education, health, agriculture, and environment were devolved entirely to the provinces.
- **Renaming of NWFP to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,** recognising Pakhtun identity.
- **Restoration of parliamentary character:** Article 58(2)(b) was removed, curbing presidential power to dismiss elected governments; the Prime Minister and Cabinet became truly answerable to Parliament.
- **Council of Common Interests (CCI)** was strengthened as the forum for resolving Centre–province and inter-provincial disputes over water, electricity, and natural resources.
- **National Finance Commission (NFC) Award** arrangements were made more favourable to provinces regarding revenue-sharing.
- Provincial autonomy in policymaking on local matters (e.g., curriculum, health policy) was substantially enhanced.

**Key Point:** The 18th Amendment is widely regarded as the constitutional fulfilment of the federal spirit envisioned in 1973, correcting decades of over-centralisation.

### Why Criticism Has Grown Recently

- **Fiscal strain on the federal government:** With a larger share of the divisible pool going to provinces under the NFC Award, the Centre argues it is left with insufficient resources for debt servicing, defence, and federal obligations, especially during economic crises.
- **Uneven devolution capacity:** Provinces, particularly smaller ones, have struggled to build the administrative capacity to manage devolved subjects like health and education effectively, leading to service delivery gaps.
- **Overlap and coordination problems:** Some devolved functions (e.g., disaster management, public health emergencies such as COVID-19) exposed confusion over which tier of government is responsible.
- **IMF and fiscal-reform pressure:** International lenders have pushed for renegotiating the NFC Award formula, arguing current federal-provincial fiscal splits are unsustainable given rising debt servicing costs.
- **Political point-scoring:** Some federal-level politicians and commentators have periodically called for a "review" of the 18th Amendment, especially when the Centre faces fiscal difficulty, reigniting the centralisation-versus-autonomy debate.

**Conclusion:** The 18th Amendment remains a landmark in strengthening Pakistan's federal democracy, but recent fiscal pressures and implementation gaps have renewed debate. The way forward lies in fiscal reform and capacity-building rather than rolling back provincial autonomy.

*Evaluate the factional politics of early years (1947-58) and its impact on the democratic process of Pakistan.*

### Introduction

The period 1947–1958 was Pakistan's formative decade, marked by weak political institutions, a strong bureaucratic-military apparatus, and intense factional rivalry within and between political parties — all of which stunted the country's democratic consolidation.

### Nature of Factional Politics

- **Death of Quaid-e-Azam (1948) and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan (1951):** Removed the two unifying leaders early, leaving a leadership vacuum filled by rival factions within the Muslim League.
- **Frequent change of Prime Ministers:** Pakistan saw seven Prime Ministers between 1947 and 1958, reflecting chronic factional infighting rather than policy differences.
- **Muslim League's organisational decline:** Having succeeded in achieving Pakistan, the League failed to transform itself into a mass-based, disciplined party and fractured into personality-based groups.
- **Provincial versus central tussles:** Language riots in East Pakistan (1952 Bengali Language Movement) and One Unit scheme (1955) in West Pakistan deepened centre–province and ethnic distrust.
- **Delay in constitution-making:** It took nine years (1947–1956) to frame the first constitution, largely due to factional wrangling over representation, religion's role, and centre-province power distribution.

**Key Point:** The absence of a strong, institutionalised political party allowed the civil bureaucracy and military to fill the resulting power vacuum, setting a precedent for future military interventions.

### Impact on the Democratic Process

- **Erosion of parliamentary norms:** Governor-Generals (notably Ghulam Muhammad) dismissed elected governments and assemblies (e.g., dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954), setting a precedent of executive overreach.
- **Weak civil-military balance:** Political instability created space for the bureaucracy and army to gain disproportionate influence in state affairs.
- **Loss of public confidence:** Frequent government changes without elections bred public disillusionment with parliamentary democracy.

- **Culmination in Martial Law (1958):** The factional chaos and failure of civilian leadership provided the justification General Ayub Khan used to impose Pakistan's first martial law in October 1958, derailing the democratic trajectory for over a decade.

**Conclusion:** The factional politics of 1947–58 reflected a failure of political leadership and institution-building rather than an inherent flaw in democracy itself. Its legacy — weak civilian institutions and a dominant establishment — continued to shape Pakistan's political trajectory for decades.

*Every state designs its foreign policy on its National interests rejecting feelings and emotions. Why did Pakistan prefer emotions, feelings and Ideology in its foreign policy? Also analyze its impact.*

### Introduction

Classical realist theory holds that states should pursue foreign policy strictly on the basis of national interest — security, economic gain, and power. Pakistan's foreign policy, however, has often been shaped by ideological and emotional considerations rooted in its identity as an ideological Islamic state born out of the Two-Nation Theory.

### Reasons for Ideological/Emotional Orientation

- **Ideological birth of the state:** Pakistan was created on the basis of religious identity, making Islamic solidarity a natural extension of foreign policy, especially toward the Muslim world (Kashmir, Palestine, Afghanistan).
- **Kashmir dispute:** Emotional attachment to Kashmir as an "unfinished agenda of partition" has driven policy more than a purely cost-benefit calculation would suggest.
- **Pan-Islamism:** Pakistan's active role in the OIC, support for Muslim causes (Bosnia, Palestine, Afghan jihad), reflects ideological solidarity rather than narrow strategic gain.
- **Security insecurity vis-à-vis India:** A deep historical mistrust dating to Partition violence has often driven emotionally charged rather than purely rational security postures.
- **Domestic political use of ideology:** Political and religious leaders have often invoked Islamic and nationalist sentiment to build domestic legitimacy, spilling over into foreign policy rhetoric.

**Key Point:** Ideology has functioned both as a genuine identity marker and as a tool used by ruling elites to mobilise public support for foreign policy choices.

### Impact of Ideological/Emotional Foreign Policy

- **Positive:** Strengthened Pakistan's soft power and leadership role in the Muslim world; enabled moral and diplomatic support for causes like Kashmir and Palestine at international forums.
- **Negative — strategic costs:** Support for the Afghan Jihad (1980s) on ideological grounds contributed to the spread of militancy and the "Kalashnikov and heroin culture" domestically.
- **Negative — economic costs:** Prioritising ideological alignments sometimes came at the expense of stronger economic partnerships that a purely interest-based policy might have pursued.
- **Strained bilateral ties:** Emotional postures on Kashmir have periodically limited flexibility for pragmatic engagement and trade normalization with India.

- **Gradual shift toward "geo-economics":** In recent years, Pakistan's official policy discourse (e.g., the "geo-economic" vision articulated post-2019) shows a conscious attempt to rebalance ideology with pragmatic economic interest.

**Conclusion:** While ideology and emotion gave Pakistan's foreign policy a distinct identity and moral standing, an overreliance on them at times came at real strategic and economic cost. A balanced approach — anchoring ideology within a framework of national interest — offers the most sustainable path forward.

*What is the volume of grants, aid and loans in Pakistan's economy in the last ten years to stimulate the growth? Discuss.*

### Introduction

Pakistan's economy has remained heavily reliant on external grants, bilateral/multilateral loans, and aid flows over the last decade to bridge its fiscal and current account deficits, finance development projects, and stabilise its balance of payments.

### Major Sources of External Financing

- **IMF Programmes:** Pakistan has entered multiple IMF Extended Fund Facility arrangements in the last ten years (2013 EFF of about USD 6.6 billion, 2019 EFF of about USD 6 billion, and a fresh Stand-By Arrangement/EFF around 2023–2024) tied to structural reform conditions.
- **China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):** Since 2015, tens of billions of dollars in Chinese loans and investment (estimates commonly cited around USD 25–60 billion across energy and infrastructure phases) have flowed into power generation, roads, and Gwadar Port development.
- **World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB):** Continuous project and budgetary support loans for energy, education, health, and infrastructure, running into several billion dollars cumulatively.
- **Bilateral support:** Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar have periodically provided deposits with the State Bank of Pakistan and oil-on-deferred-payment facilities (several billion dollars) to shore up foreign reserves.
- **Bonds (Sukuk/Eurobonds):** Pakistan has periodically raised funds from international capital markets, though access has narrowed during periods of credit-rating downgrades.

**Key Point:** Cumulatively, external debt and liabilities crossed roughly USD 130 billion by the mid-2020s, reflecting Pakistan's persistent dependence on external financing to sustain growth and meet debt-servicing obligations.

### Role in Stimulating Growth

- Financed critical energy and infrastructure projects (motorways, power plants) that supported GDP growth, particularly during the CPEC-driven growth years (2015–2018).
- Provided balance-of-payments support that prevented sovereign default during multiple crises (2013, 2019, 2022–23).
- Enabled social-sector spending (health, education) through project loans, though often insufficient relative to needs.

## Concerns

- Rising debt-servicing costs now consume a large share of federal revenue, crowding out development spending.
- Reliance on aid/loans rather than domestic revenue mobilisation and exports reflects structural weaknesses in the economy.
- Recurrent boom-bust cycles tied to IMF programme entry and exit rather than sustained reform.

**Conclusion:** Grants, aid, and loans have been indispensable in stabilising Pakistan's economy and financing growth over the past decade, but this reliance also underscores the urgent need for structural reforms — widening the tax base, boosting exports, and reducing chronic dependence on external borrowing.

*Why did Pakistan join Western Defense Pacts? What cost it had to pay for that? Explain.*

### Introduction

In the 1950s, amid Cold War rivalry, Pakistan aligned itself with the Western bloc by joining SEATO (1954) and CENTO/Baghdad Pact (1955), and by signing a bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States (1954).

### Reasons for Joining Western Defense Pacts

- **Security concerns vis-à-vis India:** Facing a much larger neighbour and unresolved disputes (Kashmir), Pakistan sought military modernisation and a great-power security guarantee.
- **Economic and military assistance:** Alliance membership brought access to US military hardware, training, and economic aid critical for a newly created and resource-poor state.
- **Weak domestic defence-industrial base:** Pakistan lacked the capacity to indigenously build a modern military, making external patronage attractive.
- **Ideological anti-communism:** Pakistan's ruling elite shared the Western concern about the spread of communism, particularly given proximity to the Soviet Union and China.
- **International diplomatic weight:** Alliance membership offered Pakistan a seat at the table in Cold War diplomacy and leverage vis-à-vis larger powers.

**Key Point:** Pakistan's alignment was driven primarily by India-centric security anxiety rather than genuine concern about Soviet expansion — a mismatch that shaped later tensions with its Western allies.

### Costs Paid

- **Alienation from the Muslim/Non-Aligned world:** Membership in Western pacts drew criticism from Arab and non-aligned states and strained relations with Afghanistan and, at various points, with the broader Muslim world.
- **Soviet estrangement:** Alliance with the West damaged relations with the USSR, pushing the Soviet Union closer to India for decades.
- **Limited actual support during wars:** Despite the alliances, the US did not provide the expected military assistance during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, since SEATO/CENTO were framed against communist aggression, not India — exposing the limits of the guarantees Pakistan had banked on.
- **Domestic militarisation of politics:** US military and economic assistance strengthened the Pakistani military establishment relative to civilian institutions, contributing to a pattern of military dominance in politics.

- **Dependency relationship:** Heavy reliance on US aid created a patron-client dynamic, later resulting in sanctions (e.g., Pressler Amendment in the 1990s) when US strategic priorities shifted.

**Conclusion:** While alliance membership brought short-term military and economic benefits, it ultimately proved a costly strategic bargain — straining ties with the Muslim world and the USSR while failing to deliver reliable support in Pakistan's actual wars with India.

*Discuss the issues and mistrust in US-Pakistan relations after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan.*

### Introduction

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and the subsequent Taliban takeover, marked a turning point in US-Pakistan relations, exposing long-standing mistrust that had been simmering since the start of the War on Terror.

### Key Issues Since the Withdrawal

- **Blame over the Taliban's return:** US officials and commentators accused Pakistan of having provided sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban over two decades, arguing this contributed directly to the group's swift takeover of Kabul.
- **Pakistan's counter-narrative:** Islamabad maintained it had pushed for a negotiated political settlement, hosted the Doha peace talks process, and warned repeatedly that a purely military approach would fail — arguing it deserves credit rather than blame.
- **Resurgence of TTP-led terrorism:** Post-withdrawal, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) intensified cross-border attacks from Afghan soil, straining Pakistan's own security and raising Pakistani frustration that the US exit left it to manage the fallout alone.
- **Reduced US strategic interest:** With troops gone, Afghanistan's — and by extension Pakistan's — centrality to US strategic calculations diminished sharply, leading to reduced US engagement, aid, and diplomatic attention ("Pakistan fatigue").
- **Frozen Afghan assets and humanitarian fallout:** Disputes over Afghanistan's frozen central bank reserves and the resulting economic/humanitarian crisis added friction, as Pakistan bore the burden of refugee inflows.
- **Diverging India-US ties:** Simultaneously, deepening US-India strategic partnership (especially in the context of countering China) further reduced Washington's reliance on Islamabad as compared to the Cold War and War on Terror eras.

**Key Point:** The core of the post-withdrawal mistrust is a fundamental divergence in narrative — Washington viewing Pakistan as having played a "double game," while Islamabad sees itself as having paid the highest price (in blood and economy) for a war it did not start.

### Broader Impact

- US-Pakistan relations shifted from a "security-first" partnership to a more transactional, limited-engagement relationship focused narrowly on counter-terrorism cooperation.

- Pakistan sought to diversify its strategic partnerships further toward China (CPEC) and Gulf states amid reduced US attention.
- Periodic high-level engagement continued (climate, economic assistance during floods, counter-terrorism coordination), but without restoring the strategic depth of earlier decades.

**Conclusion:** The Afghanistan withdrawal crystallised years of accumulated mistrust between Washington and Islamabad. Rebuilding the relationship will require both sides to move beyond blame and build cooperation on shared, narrower interests — regional stability, counter-terrorism, and economic engagement.